The state-controlled guardian of Saudi Arabia’s gargantuan oil reserves is finalizing its plan for partial privatization, Reuters reports, and will soon present it to the country’s Supreme Council for approval.

It’s not the unthinkable—there will be no corporate raiders at Saudi Aramco’s gate—but the upcoming IPO to sell less than 5% of the company, along with the recent replacement of longtime Energy Minister Ali al-Naimi with former Health Minister Khalid al-Falih, reinforces the sharp pivot in energy and economic policy declared last year.

“To essentially drop [Naimi] in a cabinet reshuffle rather than celebrate his retirement was pretty rude, even by Saudi standards,” David L. Goldwyn, a former senior energy official in the U.S. State Department, told The New York Times.

And it sends a definite signal that things will not be the way they used to be in the Kingdom. The recent action “will theoretically empower the new minister to make strategic decisions concerning Saudi Arabia’s long-term future,” wrote analysts from Stratas Advisors, who favor the new direction.

“If Falih is able to harness the competing priorities of the country’s industries in pursuit of the national interest, he will help place Saudi Arabia on a path to sustainable economic and job growth,” the firm wrote, “which would be generally preferable to a scenario in which its stability remains largely subject to the vicissitudes of the global oil market (if coupled with political reform and a dilution of Wahhabi influence within the political and educational institutions).”

Falih may run the day-to-day, but oil policy in Saudi Arabia will be directed by Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known in the country as MbS, who is second in line to the throne. To IHS Energy analysts, that means continuity.

Mohammed is sponsor of the revolutionary Saudi Vision 2030 program, approved by the king in late April, which subordinates oil to the bigger picture of economic, structural and social reforms. Rather than continually adjust production to support higher oil prices and compensate for domestic economic deficiencies, Mohammed wishes to privatize selected parts of the Saudi economy like Aramco to attract foreign currency, IHS said.

Among the changes underway are higher domestic fuel prices, which conventional wisdom among western political scientists defines as suicide for a monarchy. That viewpoint may be about to change. (this fragment is a bit odd, can it be rephrased?)

“Recently, governments in the Gulf monarchies have begun to challenge the notion that citizens are entitled to cheap energy,” wrote Jim Krane and Shih Yu Hung of Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy’s Center for Energy Studies. “All six monarchies (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain) have raised prices on transportation fuel.”

The governments seek to relieve pressure on their domestic budgets while oil and gas prices remain low on a global scale. They also hope the higher prices will reduce domestic demand, freeing supply for export.

“State subsidies and other state benefits are deployed to build legitimacy for autocratic regimes,” Krane and Hung wrote. “However, the Gulf experience (at the time of writing) has gone smoothly.”

Saudi Arabia generates most of its electricity by burning oil, they wrote. 2016 marks the first time that residential consumers have experienced a rate increase, although it only affected the higher consumption brackets.

Price hikes on gasoline, diesel, crude oil, bulk natural gas and water have drawn criticism on social media channels, with some questioning why the citizenry was called upon to help pay for weapons purchases and wars in Syria and Yemen.

Trimming subsidies has been approached cautiously by the regimes in the region, but the authors point out that “despite some grumbling … the increased prices have held.”

Joseph Markman can be reached at jmarkman@hartenergy.com and @JHMarkman.